Between 1983-95, Panjab lived under the most extraordinary legal architecture independent India has ever assembled. The Punjab Disturbed Areas Act, 1983 and the Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act, 1983, conferred shoot-to-kill powers and barred prosecution of the forces without central sanction. The National Security Act (NSA) was amended in 1984 for Panjab alone, to permit two years’ preventive detention with deferred review. The Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act,1984 created secret courts with anonymous witnesses and a reversed burden of proof. Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) followed in 1985, and was made harsher in 1987—when confessions made to police officers became admissible evidence, bail became unobtainable and guilt could be presumed. The Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act,1988 policed the Gurdwaras. Above it all sat a constitutional layer: President’s rule stretched to five continuous years by successive amendments and the chilling 59th Amendment,1988, which for Panjab alone recorded ‘internal disturbance’ as a ground for emergency, and permitted the suspension of Article 21—the right to life and personal liberty itself—before being repealed, unused, in 1990. These Acts were not all invented for Panjab. The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) 1958 was written for the Naga Hills. West Bengal was given its own preventive detention law and then Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) during the Naxalite movement in 1967. Andhra Pradesh used a 1948 Act to declare Srikakulam a disturbed area. The word ‘encounter’ entered the Indian political vocabulary in those years—in the killings of West Bengal and the staged deaths of Andhra Pradesh, and Panjab. Panjab Police, in other words, did not invent the method but inherited and industrialized it by giving it a bureaucracy of promotions and crematoria registers. Armed with this apparatus, the state in Panjab convicted almost no security personnel. Roughly 76K people were detained under TADA nationwide between 1985–94. Panjab recorded a disproportionately high number of arrests, yet its conviction rate was approximately 0.37%. If any legal regime could have tried Panjab’s militants, this one could. Instead, the state eliminated them through an economy of cash rewards and out-of-turn promotions. Bodies, not convictions, became the metric of counterinsurgency success. The template perfected in Panjab later moved to Kashmir, where the state’s own human rights commission confirmed thousands of bodies in unmarked graves (earlier coverage).






